Friday march 8, 2024, the Swedish flag was raised outside the NATO Headquarters in Brussels confirming that Sweden was finally officially welcomed as the 32nd member of the alliance.

There exist many misunderstandings about the real meaning of Swedish NATO membership. Some aspects have been difficult to fully discuss while Sweden was still in the waiting room. This article aims at providing a realistic picture of the long Swedish road. The long history of close informal cooperation between Sweden and the key alliance members is emphasized. The formal partner cooperation that step-by-step emerged from the early 1990’s is also highlighted. A realistic assessment of strategic realities forms the basis. The critical role played by Finland is particularly described in relative detail. Security policy has for decades been treated in quite static terms in Sweden, something that Sweden has ”had” rather than something Sweden has ”pursued”. As the world, Europe and of course also Sweden are now in the midst of a strategic earthquake, nothing but a very realistic analysis is relevant. Security issues have to be described and understood in realistic terms. Interests and concerns of allies as well as antagonists have to be realistically analysed. Understanding the Swedish road into NATO requires an understanding of the history as well as of the current situation.

Towards a new realism

May 8, 2022, the Finnish and Swedish governments, acting in close concert, delivered their applications for NATO membership in Brussels to the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg.

The political processes preparing the decisions by the two governments had been speedy, having started in earnest only in December 2021 as a reaction to President Putin’s ultimatum two months ahead of the Russian large-scale attack on Ukraine. The declared ambition of Putin was to establish a new partition of Europe with a Russian sphere of interest including the new NATO members in Central Europe as well as Finland and Sweden. The reaction in Finland was immediate and the concerns were made public in the traditional New Year Address by the Finnish President Niinistö.

Within days of the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022 Finland and Sweden initiated sharp reassessments of their long-established policies. The ambitions to jointly search NATO membership were soon evident. They were from the start supported by the US President. The assumption that a Russian aggression would only be conceivable within a large European conflict had been one of the pillars of Swedish non-alignment policy ever since the start of the cold war. It was now rapidly erased.

The political processes in Finland and Sweden were smooth and mutually supportive and when the two countries side by side delivered their requests for membership to the NATO Secretary General in Brussels in May 2022 the parliamentary support in both counties was rock solid. Finland was formally welcomed into NATO in April 2023, while Sweden had to wait almost another year for the final ratifications by Turkey and Hungary.

In the comfort of hindsight, the Swedish waiting time can be seen as a parenthesis. The structural adaptation to membership did in fact essentially advance as if Sweden was already a member.

As a member of NATO, Sweden will have to understand the interests and concerns of all its allies beyond the polite alliance rhetoric. Sweden will confront urgent security issues in the NATO Council. The membership responsibilities also include permanent negotiation processes around numerous tables in Brussels and in other NATO staffs.

This is of course not a completely new game. Sweden has been a member of the European Union since 1995 and a Partner nation to NATO since 1994. Nevertheless, member participation in NATO introduces new challenges by being focused on sensitive security issues that often have to be managed in real time.

From popular rhetoric to realism

However, one should not be misled by the earlier political rhetoric. While the political rhetoric has either overemphasized the steadfastness and virtues of military non-alignment or the great risks of remaining ”alone”, a more realistic hardcore approach has always had an important but hidden place.

In the comfort of the long period of military peacetime nonalignment, the security debate in Sweden was for natural reasons dominated by Sweden centric and peace- time centric perspectives. Sweden has been described as being ”peace disturbed” as it has been fortunate to prosper in peace for more than two hundred years. Political leaders have emphasized the importance of stability, but have rarely expanded their perspectives beyond the peace time framework.

Swedish security policy operated within a security environment with wide margins. There is a Swedish saying that “Health speaks with a quiet voice”. The virtues of a stable peace time environment with Sweden and Finland as a stable zone between the Warsaw Pact/Russia and NATO were often emphasized without confronting the obvious problems in an unlikely serious security crisis.

The traditional rhetoric visibly had a continued impact for a few days after the Russian large-scale attack on Ukraine as the still new Swedish prime minister was caught off guard. However, the learning curve was steep. Faced with the realities and with strong external pressures the old rhetoric faced a sudden death. The reassessment back to realism took less than two weeks. In substance it became obvious that only one hard argument against Swedish NATO membership had remained, the support for Finland. The Finnish reversal therefore also meant an immediate Swedish reversal.

Strategic realities

The Scandinavian peninsula carried a heavy strategic weight throughout large parts of the cold war. In case of a serious conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, access to Scandinavian and not least Swedish territory and air space could have been critically important for the NATO conventional defence of Central Europe. The potential role of southern Sweden as an ”unsinkable aircraft carrier” for NATO/US airpower was widely appreciated although not much talked about. It should be noted that the NATO interests in the Baltic at the time were very different from today, with strong Soviet forces and bases all along the Baltic coast as well as in the south in Central Europe.

The large Swedish air base structure by its design also had an inherent potential for receiving quite rapid and substantial outside reinforcements. It is well documented that the structure was constructed with some considerations also of US interests. The strong Swedish air defence as a side effect provided credible protection also for southern Norway which allowed for low level of NATO peace time presence from other allies. The US capacity for rapid power projection in a crisis was assuring, building on extensive peace-time preparations at air bases in Norway and Denmark and possibly also on the potential surge capacity to the comprehensive Swedish air base system.

For the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact denial of NATO access to Scandinavian territory would thus have been vital. However, a Soviet dilemma remained. It largely lacked the conventional means against the then quite strong Western defence of the area. A discomforting implication was that the Soviet military options would have relied heavily on the early use of tactical nuclear weapons. Starting in the 1960’s the Kola peninsula and its surrounding Arctic waters gradually developed into a bastion for the Soviet nuclear second-strike submarine forces. In parallel the Soviet Northern Navy was strengthened for protection as well as for offensive operations against the NATO sea lines of communications across the Atlantic. This all represented a major increase of the strategic interests in the region.

The 1980’s was a critical period. The Soviet military power had greatly expanded, while the Swedish defence faced rising problems to sustain its required strength. Recurrent underwater incursions into Swedish territorial waters added to the concerns. Continuation of military non-alignment appeared increasingly difficult.

The sudden end of the cold war confrontation in 1989 saved the situation and paved the way for a stepwise reversal of NATO as well as Swedish defence doctrines. The WP and also the Soviet Union itself were dissolved. The two German States were united and the large standing forces in the centre of Europe were withdrawn and largely dismantled. NATO, essentially with the acceptance of Russia, was opened for several new members from its former enemy camp. It was a totally new situation. NATO, contrary to many predictions, stayed in business, but was redirected from deterrence and territorial defence towards expeditionary warfare, multinational peace operations and broadened security cooperation.

The role of Sweden

Looking back at the long cold war period, conventional wisdom tells us that Sweden maintained a non-aligned position between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact based on a strong conventional defence and aiming at armed neutrality in case of a war between The Warsaw Pact and NATO.

This is a partly misleading description. It is useful to put on the strategic eyeglasses of the United States and the NATO alliance as well as of the Soviet Union.

The United States had strong strategic interests in northern Europe throughout the cold war. Those interests did not stop at the Swedish border. Noting the fact that Swedish non-alignment was accepted without visible US pressure on Sweden to join NATO, it is reasonable to assume that the then existing situation generally satisfied US interests quite well.

While the Swedish-US political relations have faced some real hard times, particularly during the Vietnam War and a following period, the military cooperation has continued largely undisturbed. The role of the Swedish defence was appreciated and the cooperation in the military-technological and intelligence domains had continuous support in spite of political contradictions. I can recall many ”teasing” comments from NATO colleagues related to Swedish non-alignment. However, they were always respectful and friendly. In short and in hindsight my understanding is that the Swedish way was respected, accepted and in fact discreetly supported by NATO friends not least in Washington.

A reasonably strong conventional Swedish defence, with an emphasis on air defence and air power, provided for the necessary freedom of action in a crisis that the US and its European allies needed. In particular, the Swedish shield was a vital prerequisite for the Norwegian acceptance of a low-profile US peace time presence. The US appears to have had no strong motives to push for a change as long as Sweden played its key role in the conventional defence of Europe. The reinforcement routes to Scandinavia were sufficiently protected to allow for a US/NATO strategy with a low level of peacetime military presence in Scandinavia.

The Swedish defence threshold was not for free. In relative terms Sweden for a long period spent substantially more on defence than most small and middle-sized European NATO members. Although outside of NATO, Sweden carried its part of the Western defence burden in northern Europe.

I recall a high-level visit from Pentagon around 1980. I was tasked to provide a presentation of a coastal invasion scenario across the Baltic Sea against Sweden in the FOA wargaming centre. Two short comments following my presentation are still remembered. The first was ”But do you really assume that NATO is doing nothing?” The second comment was ”Thank you for the presentation, but next time I would prefer to hear about a ground warfare scenario in the north!”

His short comments carried the implicit message that the US didn’t worry much about the operational situation in the Baltic. It knew that it would quite easily be able to deny the WP access to the Baltic in a conflict. Some years later I received another quite illuminating comment about US rapid reinforcement plans from a perhaps somewhat outspoken high NATO officer at a visit in Oslo. I do not remember the exact wording, but his message was clear: If the US at some time would come to the conclusion that Scandinavia needed immediate US air power reinforcements, it would not waste any time on diplomatic negotiations. The US stakes would be extremely high if a threat of nuclear escalation was looming. The US would in such a situation be ready to take whatever steps necessary to reduce the risk for a nuclear escalation. Comparing NATO-Norway and non-aligned Sweden, he noted that the difference would be very marginal. Both nations would be informed, when the powerful US air forces were already well on their way to their new bases in Scandinavia. The overall message was clear. Although formally militarily non-aligned, Sweden at the time was playing its part within the Western defence system. No changes were asked for! I recall these short and simple anecdotal comments because throughout my continued career they have helped me maintain a sound and realistic analytical framework. The political and diplomatic messaging does rarely provide the full picture. As a professional analyst you must read between the lines and think beyond the official rhetoric. The full story is rarely told explicitly. Even close friends must sometimes be able to read between the lines.

NATO, Swedish and Finnish interests have together paved the way for what is often referred to as the Nordic Balance or the Nordic Stability pattern. The role of Finland is fundamental.

No one should doubt the extraordinarily strong US and NATO interests in a reliable deterrence, but a clearly defensive military posture in the North seems to have been perceived to be in line with US as well as Scandinavian interests. Strongly supported by Norway, NATO designed a careful balancing policy with deterring as well as confidence building components. In Norwegian this was referred to as policy of deterrence and confidence enhancement (“avskrekking och beroligelse”). Efficient deterrence demanded a reliable external reinforcement capacity, while confidence enhancement largely rested on a low level of external capabilities in the region. Those Norwegian – and NATO – policies were never codified in legally binding documents. They rested entirely on mutual respect and on the NATO and Norwegian readiness to unilaterally change course in response to the situational requirements.

In the 1950’s the Swedish policy to go nuclear clearly diverged from US interests. The US pressure at the time must likely played a significant role for the final Swedish decision to abandon its nuclear weapons ambition. It is today well established that the US persuasion included bilateral security guarantees. Sweden was, although outside of NATO, in fact provided with a similar nuclear umbrella as the European NATO allies, the existence of which was kept secret for many decades. Today it is also well established that the formal military non-alignment also included close Swedish-US intelligence cooperation.

The special role of United States in NATO Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the core of NATO. It expresses the strong Trans-Atlantic solidarity, in essence expressing the US willingness to lead and to extend its nuclear umbrella to its overseas allies. In theory all allies are equal, but the real strength of NATO depends on one ally being substantially more equal than others. This makes NATO different from other interstate organizations.

It cannot be overemphasized that the overarching aim of NATO is to secure peace. The aim is to be able to deter aggression against all the allies, i e to avoid situations where the use of article 5 would be called for.

During its 75 years of existence article 5 has been called for just once, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack against the US in 2001. It was a solidarity demonstration by the US allies, but it was hardly the type of decision envisioned in the North Atlantic Treaty.

A decision by the NATO Council based on article 5 would mean that NATO has failed in its main ambition to deter aggression. Readiness and capability to act in case of failure is a necessary element in building credible deterrence, but just as important are measures that can enhance deterrence before it has been irreversibly challenged.

The NATO framework for this reason has some strong complementary components enhancing the possibilities for individual allies to act preventively early in an evolving crisis. The US as the key ally, responsible for the ultimate nuclear deterrent, certainly would never accept to be forced to sit on its hands waiting for the moment when article 5 measures are called for. The US will always strive to be able to act forcefully to strengthen deterrence. Article 5 should never need to be called for.

The twin US military structures in Europe play a vital role. SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in NATO, is always a US general (or admiral). SACEUR in parallel wears the hat of the Commander of all US military forces in Europe. In that role he or she is responsible directly and only to the US President. This means that SACEUR in cooperation with individual allies can act long before any Article 5 situation is on the NAC-table. Looking at the NATO command structure it should come as no surprise that it is connected to the US national command structure at several critical points.

The readiness of the US and of other allies to act early in a crisis is underpinned by a comprehensive structure of bilateral agreements between allies. The US has individual Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) with all its NATO allies. Those bilateral agreements between the US and its allies are indispensable complements to the overall deterrence. They are flexible instruments, which give the US and SACEUR the tools for early and appropriate preventive measures.

DCA agreements have recently been completed or updated between the US and all the Nordic states. These agreements regulate the US presence of personnel and equipment on the territories of the individual allies. They include agreed lists of the locations, which are open for US use and control. The Swedish list contains seventeen locations. In Norway there are twelve, in Finland nineteen and in Denmark three. The DCAs with the three Baltic states list a total of around twenty additional locations.

Those bilateral DCA agreement between the US and its allies represent a flexible instrument that gives the US the means for early and appropriate preventive action.

A quick look at the map provides a picture in line with the overall strategic context. Three distinct patterns can be observed. Firstly, there is a northern cluster oriented along the infrastuctural net, Narvik-Kiruna- Boden-Luleå-Rovaniemi. Secondly, there is a large cluster stretching from Norway through middle Sweden to southern Finland and the Baltic states. Finally, there is a third cluster around the Baltic approaches.

The US for obvious reasons needs easy access, good protection and a good communications infrastructure. In addition, it needs flexibility to be able to adapt to future requirements. The host nations, relying on their own military infrastructure, largely have similar interests.

Sweden and Finland

Finland has had and has a vital role in Swedish security policy. The Swedish NATO- process as it evolved was closely linked to the Finnish. The difference between Sweden and Finland has often been summarised in the observation that Finland has a long border with Russia, while Sweden has Finland as its Eastern neighbour. The real process is far more complex and needs to be viewed in its historical context. It is a long story.

For six centuries Finland was an integral part of Sweden. Most of its administrative and economic structure was formed during that period. Finland is the name in Swedish for the eastern part of the old Kingdom of Sweden. It was also referred to as the Eastern Half of the Kingdom. In Finnish the name of Finland is Suomi.

The main link keeping the two parts together was the Sea. The northern part of the Baltic, the Gulf of Bothnia, at the time acted as a mighty highway uniting the western and eastern sides. It is still reflected in the names of the provinces. In Sweden Western Bothnia, in Finland Eastern Bothnia. To the north we find Lapland with one eastern part in Finland and a western part in Sweden. The Baltic Sea has remained the major link connecting the two countries to this day.

The Swedish Kingdom, consisting of mainland Sweden and Finland, was partitioned in 1809 after a disastrous war against Russia. It resulted in Finland becoming a Grand Dutchy in the Russian Empire.

World War I and the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 opened a window of opportunity for Finland to break out of the Russian Empire. After a fierce internal struggle Finland was established as the Republic of Finland in December 1917.

The defence of Sweden for centuries started at the Swedish border in the East. The Russian period meant a change. During the 19th century the Swedish defence step by step was reoriented to meet the new realities. The Baltic Sea in all its length and the land border to Russian Finland became the new Eastern defence perimeter. The defence structure was transformed accordingly to defend the remaining Swedish territory, the new mainland Sweden.

Finnish independence meant that defence conditions changed once again, but with less impact on Swedish defence plans and structure. Assumptions about the speed of advance in case of an emerging Russian threat against Sweden through Finland were critical as the defence was built on the mobilization of a conscript army and with a significant emphasis on defence of its far away northern land border. Delaying a Soviet attack through northern Finland was a priority and Swedish defence plans built heavily on measures to constrain the logistical capacity of the Finnish communication network. The Swedish capability, which was very limited at the start of the Second World War grew very substantially as the war proceeded. The potential Russian military threat against Finland and the region remained a key dimension for Swedish defence plans during the cold war.

Contrary to the other states along the Eastern shore of the Baltic, Finland had managed to secure its independence, but the costs had been extremely high. Harsh peace conditions were forced upon Finland. Finland had to give up ten per cent of its territory, evacuate half a Million of its population in a short time and pay heavy war reparations to the Soviet Union. Finland was also forced to accept a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union that essentially stated that the Soviet Union in case of a perceived threat would militarily ”assist” Finland (The FMCA-treaty, 1948). In addition, The Paris Peace Treaty (1947) added to the burdens by setting hard constraints on its future armed forces.

Based on unpleasant realities and historic experience Finland pursued a security policy characterized by conscious carefulness, avoiding steps that risked providing room for Soviet pressure. This carefulness included avoiding cooperative measures westwards that risked being reciprocated by similar Russian demands. The long-term goal was clear, to build security linkages with western Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Community.

After the cold war the Finnish room for manoeuvre rapidly widened and was cleverly used. Step by step Finland liberated itself from the post-war Soviet-Russian embrace and moved to anchor itself in the western community. After the Six-nations accord on Germany – in effect representing the final peace agreement between the Allied Powers and Germany – the special constraints in the Paris Peace Treaty were declared as void and after the dissolution of The Soviet Union in a similar bold move the FMCA agreement was declared irrelevant.

The precarious Finnish situation always has played a vital role for the Swedish policy choice. It was a Swedish, Norwegian – and US – interest to facilitate a careful reorientation of Finnish policy into solid long-term ties with Europe and the West, while at the same time systematically working to reduce the Soviet influence.

Finland and NATO

While the ex-Soviet Baltic states as well as all the ex-Warsaw Pact states in Central Europe used the window of opportunity to seek NATO membership around the turn of the century, Finland did not. It can safely be assumed to have been a deliberate and carefully considered decision to abstain.

The Finnish deliberations are still far from clarified, but one can safely assume that there were some ”hard” factors involved in parallel with the fact that public opinion was clearly against NATO membership.

In parallel with the strengthening of its Western ties, Finland had invested heavily, politically and economically, in a long-term co-operative working relationship with Russia. That was not easily discarded. Militarily, the Finnish armed forces, relieved of its earlier constraints, was still in need of further reinforcement. Closely connected was the dilemma related to the emerging NATO doctrine focusing on crisis management and peace support operations rather than national defence. NATO doctrine development ran contrary to Finnish interests emphasising continued focus on national defence. In short, the Finnish armed forces at the turn of the century was not fully ready for NATO membership, while the security environment at the same time still was seen as providing margins for remaining outside the alliance.

While Sweden, although nonaligned, was largely following a ”NATO track” in its development of its defence structure after the cold war, Finland could not afford the luxury of a small ”NATO adapted” structure for multinational peace support missions.

The Finnish response was instead to purposefully strengthen its national defence along its own proven doctrine, to consolidate its EU anchorage in parallel with an ever-closer long-term security relationship with the United States and finally to strengthen its partner role with NATO as much as possible. In addition, it strived for increasingly close military cooperation with its Nordic neighbours, not least Sweden.

By publicly declaring a ”NATO option” policy Finland made clear that its position outside NATO was self-defined and could be reversed at any time if circumstances changed.

The Finnish option policy was not rhetorical, but was underpinned by strong efforts to forge real future freedom of action.

The evolution of the Partner roles

Sweden and Finland moved in parallel as partners to NATO. Moving in parallel has been important for both countries as it has greatly facilitated the internal political support along the road. Both countries have strived for a high degree of consensus without any serious internal disagreements.

Finland has been keen to develop its interoperability with NATO to strengthen its readiness to join NATO and supporting the integration of key US systems in the Finnish armed forces, thereby strengthening the military substance of its ”NATO option”. Sweden has striven to increase general interoperability to facilitate participation in multinational peace support operations as well as to strengthen the competitiveness of its defence industry. An earlier focus on a ”Swedish profile” was abandoned as NATO standards were increasingly required for competing in the international market.

Sweden and Finland were quick to join Partnership for Peace in 1994 and similarly moved fast to open formal delegations at NATO in Brussels in 1998. Joining the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and participation in NATO-led exercises were important for ensuring interoperability within the NATO-led Peace Support Missions in the Western Balkan, in Afghanistan and in Libya. Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the stepwise NATO redirection towards territorial defence, further important steps were taken to bring the two Partner countries closer to NATO. In 2016 Sweden and Finland both signed Host Nation Support agreements. In parallel they also joined a specially created Enhanced Operational Partnership permitting new tailor-made cooperation. A later step was to make commitments to the NATO Rapid Response Pool of forces and to participate in the full range of relevant NATO exercises. By 2020 the two Partner nations had reached a level of cooperation with NATO, where the logical next step would be membership.

The bilateral steps taken by the US and other allies to open for close military operational cooperation with the two Partner nations should also be mentioned in this context. An earlier reluctance to give non-members access to member privileges was step by step abandoned on view of the objective needs.

The final process – additional strategic perspectives

The final process was quick and has already been described, but should be seen in its full strategic context. While many point at the decisiveness shown by the Finnish political leadership and particularly the Finnish president Niinistö, the US role, although somewhat hidden, is likely to have been quite decisive. The evolving US policy towards the Nordic region since 2014 is worth a careful analysis.

Until the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, including its illegal annexation of part of Ukraine, the US maintained a rather relaxed attitude towards a Russian search for a revised European security structure. The Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 was met with little resistance. The US was ready for a reset of its relations al- ready in March 2009.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 marked a watershed and the NATO meeting in Wales in 2014 initiated a thorough reassessment process within NATO.

It is worth remembering that the inclusion of the three Baltic states in NATO represented no big problem at the time, but later became a real strategic challenge as the Russian relation with NATO gradually shifted from partnership to confrontation.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine represented a turning point. It clarified that Russia, contrary to the principles of the agreed European security order was willing and ready to use military force to change borders in Europe. The need for a robust NATO deterrent posture was once again identified, but in a radically transformed strategic setting.

The NATO response as decided in 2014 represented a turning point, but was still limited in scope. The enhanced forward presence of multinational battalions in the frontline states close to Russia represented a significant trip wire, but was still far from an efficient deterrent capability.

The revisionist Russian policy implied a dramatic increase of NATO vulnerabilities in the Baltic region. While sea denial capacity sufficed for NATO during the cold war, the security guarantees to the three Baltic states and Poland now required a far more demanding sea control ambition. While the initial response was to form a deterrent trip wire capability it was over time evident that a far more robust posture was needed. This implied a far more significant role for Sweden. In parallel the Finnish position became increasingly exposed.

Trans-Atlantic burden sharing

The challenges för NATO and thus for Europe and Sweden are not linked to Russia alone. They are also linked to internal strains within the alliance as interests and responsibilities differ between allies.

The burden sharing issue has followed NATO since its start. It is a permanent issue. The United States is paying a large part of the bill for trans-Atlantic security and its commitments to European security have been extraordinary. It is the US superpow- er protection, symbolized by the US nuclear umbrella and the US leadership that has made NATO into a success story. The US role is now changing fast. The Trump factor is important and is now driving change within NATO just as much as Russia. But whoever will be future US presidents, the US role is bound to change quite fast.

The European part of NATO, which primarily, but not only, means the member states of the European Union will have to take on a much larger share of the burden as the US interests in and possibilities for support to Europe diminish. It is an issue of responsibilities, capabilities and costs.

The European parts of NATO, including the EU but also Turkey, UK and Norway will have to bear a far larger part of the burden, raising a broad range of political challenges. They will have to be dealt with in and outside of the NATO framework. They are outside the scope of this article but must be noted. The European NATO members will need to invest heavily in security and defence in the coming years. The German Zeitenwende is only the beginning. It is today impossible to predict how fast and how high the European defence investments will rise. It is however evident that there will be a major long term shift upwards. The implications for the Nordic area and Sweden will be very significant. Defence expenditures may very well be doubled in the next five to ten years. The questions of future European leadership are equally challenging and will no doubt knock hard on the door of the European Union in the next few years.

The important and rising roles of the EU in the security field should also be noted. Measures to strengthen societal resilience are mainly national or EU responsibilities, while NATO as of now has a quite limited role beyond information exchange and general coordination. The major forum for European cooperation on security issues related to vital infrastructure as energy, communication and cyber is within the European Union. Some issues are of course appropriate to manage also within NATO, but most issues will rather be dealt with in the framework of EU-US cooperation than in NATO.

The European defence industrial cooperation is also largely covered by the EU rather than by NATO, of course with strong links to military requirements and standards formulated within the NATO framework. The European defencindustrial base will take on an increasing importance as the European role in NATO increases. The balancing of European and US interests will largely be managed outside of NATO within the EU-US framework.

Implications for Swedish defence policy

The defence policy debate in Sweden has, since the decision to apply for membership in NATO, been focused on the challenges which are linked to the NATO process. However, the most demanding challenges go far beyond the NATO process. Irrespective of NATO membership the critical challenges are linked to the changed strategic environment. The roles of Sweden and Finland have been fundamentally transformed by the fact that a robust NATO defence of its eastern border, which now includes Finland, necessitates substantial external preparations in Sweden already in peace time.

Present Russian policy and actions leave little room for ambitions by the Nordic states to satisfy Russian demands for confidence building assurances. Building robust deterrence will be the obvious priority. Any future confidence building process must be mutual and has to be initiated by a Russian policy reversal.

That said, it seems nevertheless likely that it will be in the interest of the US that the states in the region and the whole NATO to work for a deterrent structure that enhances crisis stability. The historic balancing act between providing rock solid deterrence and a non-threating posture is of course always relevant, given the strategic role of the north-western region for Russia. But the balancing point has unavoidably been shifted towards a greater need for US and NATO deterrent capabilities in the Nordic region. It will most likely be reflected in an increased non-Nordic military footprint. The exact composition will have to be carefully considered and related to available Nordic capabilities as well as to the evolving Russian force posture.

US perceptions seem to be well reflected in the broad range of locations listed in the DCAs. It seems likely that the US will aim at flexibility and adaptability linked to evolving NATO defence plans, evolving Nordic force structures and of course Russian behaviour.

The Swedish role in NATO

It should always be emphasized that the Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO does not change the world. Geography remains the same as do many dimensions of hard security. When discussing the implications of the memberships for NATO and the two new member nations, it should be underlined that a very large part of the new measures that are planned are related to the challenges raised by the dramatic changes in the strategic environment rather than by the memberships themselves. The fact that NATO has widened is itself a result of those changes, which make it difficult to separate cause and effect. Overall, the synergies of being part of an alliance built around collective defence should lead to improved cost-efficiency for the individual allies.

The Swedish role will have to be viewed in its full Nordic context. The fact that all the Nordic states are now members of NATO surely opens new roads for cooperation. A broad range of possibilities were identified fifteen years ago by the chiefs of defence of Sweden, Norway and Finland and was followed by a political study lead by the former Norwegian foreign minister Torvald Stoltenberg. Those ideas could now be further explored.

In the present security environment, the solid anchorage of the Fennoscandian region within NATO is vital. Situated next to the Russian strategic bastion on and around the Kola peninsula and essentially being the western edge of the Eurasian landmass it is unavoidably strategically exposed.

The strategic importance of the Arctic region is growing as the global warming is opening new sea lanes between Asia and Europe and giving access to valuable natural resources.

The small Nordic states need the support of its mightier allies, and they need the security guarantees that only permanent strong ties can provide. First and foremost, Finland, with a 1340 km land border with Russia, will need the back-up of a permanent peace time NATO presence to secure deterrence. Ideally the NATO presence should include a solid defensively oriented US component, but leaving the initially available offensive components in the hands of Finland and its neighbouring allies. Combining a permanent NATO command in Finland with preparations for rapid reinforcements would provide for a resilient NATO force structure that can rapidly be adapted to a more aggressive Russian posture.

A special dimension relates to the likely adaptation of the NATO Command structure to the increasing needs in the North. A new NATO Headquarters in the Nordic area is presently being considered. It requires a careful balancing of political and military factors with few ready answers. Strong US as well as regional interests support close links to the NATO Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, USA, while the obvious links with Poland and Germany in the southern part of the Baltic give NATO Joint Forces Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, a natural role. Implementation would have to be urgent. Practical possibilities including protection will thus play a decisive role. The Russian posture and behaviour will always be the key factor determining the NATO posture in the area. Despite, or perhaps because of, its strategic importance, the Nordic area has remained a zone of relatively low open confrontation. Despite its large strategic forces, Russia, like the Soviet Union, has had a relatively low conventional military footprint in the area, contributing to a stable relationship with its neighbours. Whether the pattern of relative stability can prevail in the tense security climate of today remains to be seen. It will essentially be dependent on the evolving Russian force posturing. Growing Norwegian concerns about maritime security in its northern waters are strongly underlined in the new Norwegian defence plan.

The Nordic stability pattern has until recently largely been characterized by a low level of permanent outside NATO presence in the area. The NATO restraints are continuously being adapted to the perceived demands for force levels and readiness. The Russian war against Ukraine has markedly lowered the threshold for open aggressive measures. “Gray-zone aggression” in cyberspace and in the global commons are continuously being carried out.

It is much too early to draw firm conclusions about the future Swedish role in NATO. NATO is evolving in response to the requirements that are defined by the overall strategic context. This presently includes a broad range of major uncertainties.

However, considering the present regional challenges some important conclusions can be drawn. Sweden has a major role in securing deterrence in northern Europe. Regional capabilities will be important not least to be able to respond to grey zone threats well below a clear article 5 threshold. This implies a very substantial increase of Swedish capabilities and infrastructural resilience.

Sweden should be able to receive and protect effective outside support, but it also needs nationally controlled means to influence the evolution of a spiralling conflict to reduce the room for speculations about keeping the conflict constrained.

Sweden, like other small members of the alliance should preferably maintain capabilities that can persuade the potential aggressor, Russia, that there is no level of aggression that is too large for Sweden to handle while being too small for NATO to engage in with its full force. By cooperating with its neighbouring allies, the regional threshold can be raised.

By geographic proximity Sweden is a vital support of the back for the collective NATO defence of its members on the eastern side of the Baltic Sea and in northern Scandinavia. This puts heavy requirements on protection of the Swedish territory in an emerging crisis. This also requires preparations in peace time. The details will have to be defined in close coordination with the relevant NATO allies. Contrary to a common misunderstanding, the North Atlantic Treaty does not put any defined requirements on individual allies. Its article 3 states the responsibility of the individual member to care for its own defence according to its capacity, while at the same time providing solidaric support toits allies. The capacities of different members of course differ widely. Considering the presently thin Swedish military structure, it seems likely that NATO priorities for the short run will emphasize measures inside Sweden rather than measures to strengthen NATO expe- ditionary forces. Air defence, intelligence and surveillance, logistical support as well as protection and infrastructural resilience are short term investments that will be high on the list. Considering the significance of airpower in the region it seems likely that a large emphasis will have to be put on consolidating and adapting the Swedish air base structure to be able to serve NATO forces from neighbouring as well as other more distant allies.

Sweden of course will need to contribute to the credibility of deterrence by active participation in the different NATO tripwire units, but considering the NATO requirements on host nation support, a NATO focus on Swedish expeditionary capabilities seem less likely at least in the short run.

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