Peace Sells, but Who's Buying?

In this paper we will examine the relationship between the idealism of the West and the political quake it often creates. Our argument will be validated by focusing on the transfer of aircraft to Ukraine, and how the Western piecemeal approach to military exports prolongs the war.

Geopolitical stress has made the defense industry a vital instrument. In spite of currently flourishing, the military-industrial complex has substantially diminished in the past decades.[1] Where and to whom arms are directed, shapes political trends. Armaments represent both the solution to, and means of war. The impact of exports must therefore be considered; something Western countries often have failed to grasp. Upon addressing the National Endowment for Democracy, former US President George W. Bush stated, “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because, in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty”.[2] American aid post WWII created strong partnerships. It shaped NATO, the longest serving coalition ever.

The Marshall Plan was a great success. However, the USA and Europe shared a similar culture, religion, and values. A similar strategy on a global scale does not necessarily work.[3] Professor Amitai Entzioni points to the German sociologist Maximilian Carl Emil Weber´s thesis on cultural differences, “These cultures can change, but, as the record shows, only slowly, and the changes involved cannot be rushed by outsiders”.[4] All too often one has ignored human rights violations in nations weighed as partners.

Failures of the past are likely to influence public opinion. This could call for a change in perspective and future strategy. According to a recent report from the University of Gothenburg, world democracy is in decay, and the number of autocracies triumphs that of liberal democracies.[5] Yet, the West still cooperates with nations that continue to inflict devastation on its people and vicinity.[6]

In his speech at the League of Nations in 1933, Joseph Goebbels stated that, “Sirs, a man's house is his castle. We are a sovereign state. Let us do as we intend to do with our socialists, our pacifists, and our Jews”.[7] Yet, Europe favored a policy of appeasement that had disastrous consequences. It is therefore prudent to question whether arms should be bestowed upon countries that have not eliminated what made them autocracies in the first place.

Arms export controls are laws designed to prevent sensitive technology falling into hostile hands. How can Arms Exports promote national and coalitional interests, and simultaneously mitigate the risk of eliciting self-sabotage?

Lost Balance - Reattaining Common Protocol

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was established in 1996, and it mandates participating nations to uphold export controls on conventional arms and dual-use (civilian and military application) commodities.[8] The arrangement replaced the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) which acted as an allied export authority during the Cold War.

Russia, India, South Africa, and Ukraine are all members of WA. William Alan Reinsch argues that reaching a consensus with Russia is nearly impossible, and the absence of an expulsion instrument undermines the arrangement.[9] Dialogue, conciliation, and consensus are fundamental Western traits. However, sustaining arrangements with actors who incapacitate, should encourage immediate change. A new structure with a member mass resembling that of COCOM could prove opportune. Yet, it would not address the real delicate matter; why transfers to autocratic nations still occur, and how they give rise to conflicts.

A multilateral export control framework may seem practical. However, it carries the explicit risk of compromising sensitive technology. Steven Feldstein and Fiona Brauer submits that although Russia was hit hard with sanctions after the Ukrainian invasion, Western export controls have failed, “...yet the factors driving Russia’s adaptation—the ubiquity of digital technology, globalized supply chains, and geopolitical fragmentation—are not mere loopholes to be closed”.[10] It could therefore be argued that the West’s inclusion of the “less fortunate” parts of the world into its trade grid, has provided an outcome where export control has been lost. Thus, Russia is exceedingly resilient in the ongoing War in Ukraine. On the other hand, current export controls might suffice if the value chain was made exclusive.

In viewing Russian action and the risk of compromising sensitive technology to China, U.S. authorities expressed a desire to strengthen control efforts with allies.[11] The Department of Commerce promotes U.S. interests through export control of dual-use technology. This is the same technology where the WA mandates export control. Alynay Junusova submits that, “The need for a new multilateral approach emerged due to the ineffectiveness of the WA”.[12] Stability through exclusion ordains effectiveness.

Military-Industrial Complex

In the Fiscal Year 2023 the U.S. Department of State (DoS) approved the transfer of defense articles, services, and security cooperation activities under the Foreign Military Sales system to allies and partners totaling $80,9 BUSD.[13] On Direct Commercial Sales, the number was $157,5 BUSD. These are staggering numbers, and according to DoS an annual all time high. They do not include commodities sold without DoS licenses. In addition, a considerable amount of dual-use articles are sold either regulated or without license requirements. On top of all that, the USA  employs defense contractors like no other. The effects of the increased sales can add to Admiral Pierre Vandier inclination for Europe to spend more to win the global arms race.[14] Without the extra spending the integrity of NATO itself becomes delicate.

In his farewell address in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned the American people, "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist”.[15] President Eisenhower's address is often read as  a caution to the close relationship between the military and the defense industry. Nonetheless, according to an article in the Air & Space Forces Magazine addressing Eisenhower's message, “...Eisenhower made two explicit points: The Cold War was caused by communist aggression, not the greed of US defense contractors, and the existence of the military-industrial complex was vital, not insidious”.[16] Thus, one could make the argument that the military-industrial complex solely thrives on war. However, this would be a heedless statement in that it lacks an acknowledgement of its crucial deterrence and therefore discourages war.

The military-industrial complex secures the freedom we currently enjoy. But, it is its decline, and not often perceived abundance that makes it struggle to suffice.[17] The interconnected nature of it ensures that military requirements and state matters receive proportionate attention. After all, it serves a purpose in both war and peace. Thus, it must be strong enough to prepare for and sustain war.

The Clausewitzian Trinity of War argues that, “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless”.[18] Likewise, the military-industrial complex must base its objectives on the political leadership and therefore the will of the people. Any lack of clarity would jeopardize its tranquility.

Logistics: the Fountainhead for Success in Military Operations 

The free world is witnessing a growing political divide. People have been subjected to more radical and extreme occurrences. The numerous terrorist attacks on Western soil, the reentrance of the Cold War, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has anchored this pattern. Self perseverance and regional security has caught the public eye. This has yielded a greater acceptance for defense spending, and support to Ukraine.

Transfers of weapon systems demand transportation, training, sustainment, and follow-on support. Western mission-readiness has dwindled, and can hardly fulfill the role originally intended. The West has been faced with providing security beyond the coalition. The prospect of depreciating mobility and deterrence, must not be underestimated. LtCol Marcus Gillett submits that, “Fundamentally, logistics formations bring credibility to strategic signaling in general deterrence and enable tactical and operational effectiveness in crisis and conflict only through investment in competition”.[19] Did the West not sufficiently invest in Ukraine's defense, or did Russian nuclear threats deter western aid? Several military and foreign policy experts have called for a humanitarian no fly zone.[20] The risk of drawing NATO into combat with Russia has deemed it, and other attempts of yielding better support, as hopeless. Professor Alberto Coll addresses the ill-fated strategy on Ukraine and submits that, “For 33 months now, the Biden administration has refused to give Ukraine in a timely fashion the long-range capabilities and air defenses it needs to win decisively. As a result, the conflict has become a stalemate war of attrition”.[21] The recent firing of long range missiles into Russia, and deploying U.S. military maintainers to Ukraine has therefore stunned parts of the Western military and political community. Especially considering the pending presidential inauguration in the USA, and with it an expected truce. However, ramping up the military support to Ukraine Would likely enable president-elect Trump with a better chance dealing with Putin.[22]

Military Aid as an Evolving Story

The initially launched military aid to Ukraine was perceived as non-threatening. Limited to rations, defensive capabilities, and gradually escalating to kinetic equipment. While allowing for sustained assistance, this aid has failed to provide Ukraine with advantages at critical moments. A comprehensive aid strategy could have altered the balance of power earlier in the conflict, raising the question of whether strategic hesitation has prolonged the war.

Early 2023, public debate centered on the provision of fighter jets and advanced tanks to Ukraine. The discussion emerged alongside German and American hesitation to provide Leopard 2 tanks. Eventually, they committed to 80, where Norway contributed 36.[23] The Ukrainian President emphasized that Western jets were a priority, and the Netherlands expressed willingness to provide F-16s. Poland offered MIG-29s in exchange for F-16s from the U.S, which was rejected out of fear of escalation.[24] Sweden turned down the request for Gripen fighters.[25] The Swedish Prime Minister remarked that there are inherent risks in warfare; becoming an active participant.

During a meeting with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that the most critical contributions were provided.[26] Referring to tanks and armored vehicles, ammunition, and spare parts. Requests for fighter jets were precedently met with vagueness, and Stoltenberg himself sought to mitigate the debate.

Poland and the Netherlands withdrew their commitments to provide F-16s and Leopard 2s.[27] Poland initially pledged to provide F-16s, but reversed course due to concerns about its own aerial capacity. The Polish President explained that Poland’s fleet required maintenance. Similarly, the Netherlands had floated the possibility of donating its fighter jets, and initially promised to send 18 Leopard 2A7 tanks, a pledge later withdrawn. The Dutch government cited its own defense needs, and affirmed the tanks were leased from Germany. In lieu of fighter jets and advanced tanks, the Dutch, Germans, and Danes committed to provide older Leopard tanks.[28]

UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace noted that delivering advanced weapon systems would take months.[29] Wallace considered it more feasible and effective to consider such contributions post war. He emphasized that deploying aircraft is not purely “towing a plane close to the border.” Meanwhile, the Kremlin issued warnings that indirect and direct involvement was becoming increasingly blurred amid the debate over military aid.[30]  President Joe Biden initially declined to provide F-16s to Ukraine.[31] An American four star expressed support for both fighter jets and air defense systems. General Christopher Cavoli described the issue as highly sensitive, and divisive within NATO. Speaking to Politico, General Cavoli noted that such contributions would pose a significant threat to adversaries while boosting Ukraine’s military confidence and capabilities.[32] The General​`​s perspective carried considerable weight, and the USA signaled that the Ukrainian request could be granted. Congressman Michael McCaul considered the approval likely, suggesting pilot training could commence pending adjudication.[33] Biden reiterated his opposition to transferring F-16s, emphasizing that Ukraine urgently required tanks, artillery, and air defense, effectively closing the matter.[34]

The international pressure continued to deliver both aircraft and training. Norway committed to contribute F-16s for pilot training in Denmark, coordinated by Denmark and the Netherlands. The announcement did not mention aircraft for permanent transfer.[35] At this stage, it was unlikely that Ukraine would receive jets before the following year. Additionaly, the U.S. believed that the fighter jets would have little impact.[36]

A second F-16 training center in Romania was established, where its first pilots graduated earlier this year. This center was a collaboration between Lockheed Martin and the Dutch and Romanian governments.[37] In August 2023 the U.S. finally approved the transfer of F-16s. Ukraine finally received its first aircraft late august 2024, with approximately 60 more over the coming months.[38] Almost one and a half years after the initial debate started.

Military Aid, Purely Window Dressing?

Several nations made high-profile announcements of military aid to Ukraine, often prematurely touting deliveries of advanced weapon systems. Public opinion in Norway persisted as strongly supportive of military aid. A survey found that 81% of Norwegians were either fully, or partially in favor of giving F-16s to Ukraine.[39] A related question found that 84% agreed (fully or partially) that Ukraine should receive modern fighters. It’s safe to assume that public support was similar in the rest of the West.

A critical aspect of awarding fighter jets to Ukraine, has been the participation of NATO’s former Soviet-bloc members. Over the past two decades, 14 former Warsaw Pact countries joined NATO, inheriting substantial fleets of Soviet-era aircraft like MIG-29s and SU-25s. Yet, only a handful of these nations, such as Poland and Slovakia, committed to deliver them said jets.

Poland offered their MIG-29 in exchange for F-16s from the United States.[40]A somewhat short ordeal compared to the Slovak approach. Their current government initiated an investigation of their predecessors, for transferring aircraft and an air defense system.[41] This was a stark reversal from the country’s prior stance. The investigation derived from the previous administration’s lack of authority to exercise such critical decision-making. Slovakia has yet to receive the F-16s it commissioned.

The Romanian MIG-21 fleet sun-downed in 2023, leaving them with approximately 25 aircraft. General Stefan Danila remarked that Ukraine didn’t express any interest in the aircraft.[42] Soviet-era aircraft were approaching their serviceable end. The Bulgarians had placed an order for eight F-16s, and pending their arrival they operated the MIG-29.[43] The transfer of MiGs to Ukraine would render the Bulgarian airspace defenseless, a contingency deemed unacceptable. The fighters required Russian parts, further complicating matters. Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defense denied any formal discussions on providing MiG-29s free of charge. Officials have instead explored “triangular deals,” wherein Bulgaria could exchange older Soviet-era equipment for modern Western military hardware.

Croatia officially retired its MiG-21 fleet as of December 1, 2024.[44] Croatia ordered 12 second-hand Rafales from France, while Hungary and Italy substitutes for air policing until the jets are received. Bulgaria, Poland, and Serbia continue to operate MiG-29s but they are actively seeking replacements. This pattern reflects a trend of rushing to secure goodwill through public commitments, often without assessing logistical feasibility. While these announcements may have served domestic and public relations purposes, they risked creating false expectations and delaying Ukraine’s access to military capabilities. In a conflict defined by timing and momentum, premature boasting has had tangible consequences.

Eastern NATO states were gradually NATO-standardizing their armaments. Their willingness to donate older Soviet-era aircraft was contingent upon assurances of Western replacements—a promise often mired in bureaucratic and manufacturing delays. Why has the process of acquiring Western aircraft proven so complex? The broader trend suggests a disconnect between political promises and military execution. The slow rollout of fighter jets —almost 18 months after the initial debate—reflects a failure to align intent with action. The U.S. has stated that military maintainers can provide maintenance of F-16s on Ukrainian soil.[45] American authorities emphasized that their role would transpire far from the frontlines and not carry combat engagement. This is a radical shift in policy, and one that entails active participation in the Ukrainian war effort by NATO. 

Replacing outdated jets with modern fighters through a streamlined “donate-and-replace” model seems both logical and efficient. Yet, implementation has been far from straightforward. Is this delay driven solely by logistical bottlenecks—or could economic and political interests be at play? After all, military contracts for advanced aircraft like the F-16 involve billions of dollars and extensive lobbying by defense contractors.

The difficulty of executing what appears to be a mutually beneficial strategy raises questions about whether military effectiveness was ever the primary concern—or if commercial and geopolitical calculations took precedence behind closed doors.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s defense against Russia over the past three years shows that the collective approach—though at times fragmented—enabled Ukraine to withstand a full-scale invasion. However, in wars of attrition, survival alone will not suffice. The war’s outcome may ultimately hinge on the efficiency and cohesiveness of military aid. This reality underscores the tension between the desire to support Ukraine and the reluctance to fully commit—leaving Kyiv both empowered and constrained. This piecemeal approach prolongs the war of attrition, while serving political posturing.

The challenge lies in crafting a policy architecture that ensures military effectiveness, and strategic foresight. This demands a recalibration of export controls: tightening safeguards without stifling essential aid and geopolitical stability. In the absence of such recalibration, the very tools designed to secure peace will become instruments of instability.

Photo: Forsvaret