Emerging Truce Between Russia and Ukraine: The Georgian Paradigm

This article explores the challenges of achieving a truce and eventually lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. Supported by cautionary lessons from Georgia, I will provide a short analysis of what we can anticipate. 

Background

Russia launched an unprecedented crusade of death and destruction in Ukraine. This shocked the international community. President Vladimir Putin justified Russian action by alluding to NATO’s eastern advancement and his obligation to “denazify” Ukraine. Putin expected an expeditious offensive, but the Russian leader miscalculated Ukrainian resilience and Western support.

The offensive in 2022 marked an appalling development in the conflict. Although casualties are mounting on both sides, there are officially no verifiable numbers. However, the Pentagon estimates Russian casualties to have eclipsed 600,000.^[1] In addition to human and infrastructural costs, the war has caused a notable economic impact. Thus far, the West has failed to provide Ukraine with decisive military means to defeat the Russian offensive, initiating attrition warfare.^[2] The suffering is inconceivable, and any prospect of peace has so far only delivered a “Gordian Knot”. Nevertheless, In an interview with Sky News, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pleaded for ending what he called “the hot phase of the war”.^[3] President-elect Donald J. Trump has confidently declared that he will personally end the war. Trump's intention stems from his political inclination to suspend Ukrainian aid. A cut-off would undermine Ukrainian morale and therefore survivability.

Coarse Battle Rhythm

The Ukrainians have gallantly fought the Russians for an extended period of time. This would not have been possible without financial aid and military equipment. However, they are also facing a personnel crisis. Just last month, and upon addressing these shortages, Felicia Schwartz and Christopher Miller noted that, “Russian forces have advanced in recent months at the fastest rate since the early weeks of the invasion in 2022”.^[4] The situation on the battlefield is not encouraging.

If the USA terminates Ukrainian aid, it will leave Europe in a bind. Daniel Fiott argues that this would cause European aid to cease.^[5] Zelensky realizes this and is therefore actively demanding that any agreement would have to be accompanied by NATO membership. Despite closer relations and prior commitments, Ukraine was never groomed for admission.^[6] Ambassador Julianne Smith recently stated that, “We are not at the point right now where the Alliance is talking about issuing an invitation in the short term”.^[7] Enrolling Ukraine into NATO would necessitate an Article 5 response and therefore throw NATO directly into the conflict. Ukraine will not be initiated as a member without a lasting solution to the Russian-occupied areas.

History will scrutinize whether Western aid was adequately balanced in terms of not engaging the West directly into war. Russian nuclear deterrence intimidated the West to support Ukraine only to the degree that it delivered no decisive effect. This unfortunate circumstance has left Ukraine in a state of gridlock and despair. The scale of the invasion drew international attention, prompting continued, but yet inadequate support. For a long period of time, Zelenskyy has shown an uncompromising will to not give up any Ukrainian land. A survey in 2024 found that 90% of Ukrainian respondents opposed surrendering territory to Russia, but the researchers also noted that, “So while there is still majority – if diminished – support for fighting to restore full territorial integrity, there is growing support for negotiations”.^[8] This is something the Ukrainian people must face. 

Anticipating what terms would render a plausible truce is an elusive venture. Yet, history provides a contemporary example for comparison. How can we envision an outcome against the backdrop of experiences from the war in Georgia?

Russo-Georgian War

The war in Georgia was short lived, only lasting a few days. In contrast to Ukraine, Western protests were weak and mostly restrained.^[9] Regardless, the Russian invasion triggered a new Cold War era.^[10] Prior to the offensive, Georgia wanted to join the EU and NATO. With the invasion, President Putin demonstrated that he would not tolerate any further Western advancement.

The former French President Nicolas Sarkozy mediated a truce between the two countries. However, Sarkozy faced criticism for sanctioning an agreement that failed to compel Russian troops to leave occupied territory.^[11] Dr. Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier contends that the agreement favored Russia, and submits that, “This conflict cannot be put in brackets and it will weigh on future events”.^[12] It has undoubtedly influenced successive events. For Russia it outlined a viable strategy for future operations. Georgia did not become a part of Russia, but it never regained the territories it lost. Henceforth, Russia has continued to engage in actions that undermine international law, including ethnic cleansing, displacements, and non-stop military presence. Russia has faced little accountability.

Georgia has yet to be admitted into NATO. Tim Marshall argues that, “Moscow would prefer to extend its bufferzone, but can manage without taking all of Georgia. However, this could change if Georgia were perceived to be on track for NATO accession. That is precisely why NATO has so far blocked its admission”.^[13] This corners Georgia with an existential uncertainty. The ruling Georgian Dream Party recently decided to cease all efforts on EU membership.^[14] The decision has caused the general public to protest. Nonetheless, the decision is surely a token of submission. 

Georgia appears to be gradually conceding to Moscow, and today the country is governed by a pro-Russian administration. Emil Avdialini argues that the Russian effort in Ukraine has caused Russian control in the South Caucasus to drop.^[15] Avdialini further contends that this accommodates Georgia to pursue more assertive foreign policy actions.​ Such actions would however warrant a government more aligned with Western interests. An accompanying Western approach with a sincere welcome mat would also be required. 

Upon discussing why Russia would never accept the accession of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, Professor John J. Mearsheimer submits, “Imagine the outrage if China built an impressive alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it”.^[16] Ukraine demands Russian focus at the moment, but Georgia will for the foreseeable future continue to be subjected to Russian intimidation. Russia will never accept any further eastward NATO advancement.

In a Nutshell

Vladimir Putin initially expected a quick victory in Ukraine. However, the War has now entered its third year. Despite a crippling casualty rate, the Russian war machine has proven a brute force. Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote, “I believe that the main and most fundamental spiritual quest of the Russian people is their craving for suffering—perpetual and unquenchable suffering—everywhere and in everything”.^[17] There is some truth to Dostoevsky`​s notion. Putin's image as a strong and determined leader will ensure ongoing public support. By dismissing the human suffering, Putin and Russia are in this for the long run.

The war in Georgia demonstrated that Russia will not renounce conquered land. Lasting peace after a Russo-Ukrainian armistice will therefore not transpire. Russia will only accept an agreement that favors their objectives. Forthcoming negotiations are much more a result of Ukraine losing the war, and not merely owing to President Trump`s​ promise.

Conclusion

The grim reality should suffice to counter any customary “ostrich effect”. Ukraine's best bet is NATO membership, but this would never be approved by Moscow, nor would NATO consider it. That leaves surrendering occupied territories, facing a staggering death toll, and accepting limited security guarantees.

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